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Презентация на тему Central Africa

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Central Africa – Today
Central AfricaCurrent Threat ConditionsU.S. National Security ObjectivesCINC Operational ObjectivesIPB OverviewBattlespace EnvironmentImpacts on Central Africa – Today Current ThreatThe D.R.C. is a lawless land unable to capitalize on its Current ThreatStrapped for the cash needed to deal with their enemies, D.R.C. Nuclear Fuel Cycle - 101 Vulnerability of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle D.R.C. Link with the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Current Threat – Fissionable MaterialBuilt in 1959 via President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Current Threat – Nuclear MaterialUranium    Dioxide (UO2)1 ton of Uranium   Dioxide (UO2)1 ton of ore contains 0.3 - 0.6% Current Threat – Nuclear Materials Trafficking Current IntelligenceA CIA electronic surveillance in the Gecamines building (the D.R.C. state Current IntelligenceThe CIA in Zanzibar, Tanzania tracking elements of Al Qaeda have Summary of the NSC Situation BriefCumulative CIA evidence suggests Al Qaeda is Summary of the NSC Situation Brief (2)CIA proposes a black operation to:Find Summary of the NSC Situation Brief (3)The President agreed with the CIA Summary of the NSC Situation Brief (4)The President’s decisions continued:SOCOM will assume National ObjectivesThe President’s stated the following national objectives for Operation Cakewalk:Ensure nation CINC ObjectivesFind, track, and stop D.R.C. shipment(s) of nuclear materials (yellow-cake )Identify Operation Cakewalk – IPBDefine the EnvironmentTerrain, weather, infrastructure, demographicsHistory, political relationships, economicsEvaluate Southern Africa – Terrain & WeatherLikely operating area to track shipment Southern Africa - Vegetation Central Africa – Colonization/Languages Southern Africa – Population Density Religions of Central AfricaSudan’s border with C.A.R., D.C.R., and Uganda represents a Religions of Central AfricaSudan’s border with C.A.R., D.C.R., and Uganda represents a Southern Africa – Infrastructure D.R.C.TanzaniaZambiaCongoBurundiRwandaAngolaC.A.R.SudanCentral Africa – Regional ConflictBanguiKenyaUganda D.R.C.TanzaniaZambiaCongoBurundiRwandaAngolaSudan vs SPLA SudanC.A.R.KenyaUgandaCentral Africa – Regional Conflict D.R.C.TanzaniaZambiaBurundiRwandaAngolaSudan vs SPLA C.A.R. vs Rebel Military C.A.R.BanguiSudanCongoKenyaUgandaCentral Africa – Regional Conflict D.R.C.TanzaniaZambiaCongoBurundiRwandaAngolaSudan vs SPLA SudanC.A.R. vs Rebel Military C.A.R.Congo vs Ninja RebelsBanguiD.R.C.– Safe TanzaniaZambiaBurundiRwandaAngolaC.A.R.D.R.C.BanguiCongoKenyaUgandaCentral Africa – Regional ConflictSudan DRC vs   MLC   CRDTanzaniaZambiaBurundiRwandaAngolaC.A.R.D.R.C.BanguiCongoKenyaUgandaCentral Africa – Regional ConflictSudan DRC vs   MLC   CRDTanzaniaZambiaBurundiRwandaAngolaC.A.R.D.R.C.BanguiCongoKenyaUgandaCentral Africa – Regional ConflictSudan Central Africa – Economic StatusContinuous conflict has made Central Africa one of Opposition TTPTo be suppliedDRC Mining practicesKinshasa reactor operationsAl Qaeda cell practices Shipment COA AnalysisShipment OptionsRail COARoad COARail/Road COAAir COA Opposition COA Analysis – Rail@	-	Not operational Kolwesi To:@	-	Not operationalBorder X-ingsDist (Km)/ # DaysLobito	1450/@	1Opposition COA Analysis – Rail Kolwesi To: *	-	Requires transload from 1.000m gauge track to 1.067m gauge track@	-	Not Kolwesi To:Border X-ingsDist (Km)/ # DaysLobito	1450/@	1Dar es 	2125/4	2SalaamMombasa	2315/6*	3Opposition COA Analysis – Rail Kolwesi To:Beira	2459/5	3@	-	Not operational*	-	Requires transload to 1.067 gauge trackBorder X-ingsDist (Km)/ # DaysLobito	1450/@	1Dar Transportation Options: RailKolwesi To:Durban	2936/6	4@	-	Not operational*	-	Requires transload to 1.067 gauge trackBeira	2459/5	3Border X-ingsDist (Km)/ # DaysLobito	1450/@	1Dar es 	2125/4	2SalaamMombasa	2315/6*	3 Transportation Options: Rail@	-	Not operational*	-	Requires transload to 1.067 gauge trackKolwesi To:Durban	2936/6	4Cape Town	3611/7	4Beira	2459/5	3Border X-ingsDist Most Likely Railroad COAAD.R.C.ZambiaD.R.C.TundumaKolwesiLikasiLubumbashiChingolaMpikaKasamaNjombe Shipment COA Analysis – RoadTo be supplied Shipment COA Analysis – AirTo be supplied Opposition COA Analysis – AirBlue Force Course of Action AnalysisForce StructureForce EmploymentTo be supplied….
Слайды презентации

Слайд 2 Central Africa – Today

Central Africa – Today

Слайд 3 Current Threat
The D.R.C. is a lawless land unable

Current ThreatThe D.R.C. is a lawless land unable to capitalize on

to capitalize on its huge store of valuable natural

resources
Years of conflict have left the D.R.C. in economic turmoil and incapable of assembling the resources necessary to control its borders or the multiple factions inside the country

Слайд 4 Current Threat
Strapped for the cash needed to deal

Current ThreatStrapped for the cash needed to deal with their enemies,

with their enemies, D.R.C. has shown a willingness to

deal with rouge nations & terrorist organizations
D.R.C. has been the object of terror states and organizations to obtain nuclear materials for “dirty bombs” and fissionable material to generate WMD

Слайд 5 Nuclear Fuel Cycle - 101

Nuclear Fuel Cycle - 101

Слайд 6 Vulnerability of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Vulnerability of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Слайд 7 D.R.C. Link with the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

D.R.C. Link with the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Слайд 8 Current Threat – Fissionable Material
Built in 1959 via

Current Threat – Fissionable MaterialBuilt in 1959 via President Eisenhower’s “Atoms

President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” program
Refurbished in 1972 and

uses HEU fuel rods

Слайд 9 Current Threat – Nuclear Material
Uranium

Current Threat – Nuclear MaterialUranium  Dioxide (UO2)1 ton of ore

Dioxide (UO2)
1 ton of ore contains 0.6% uranium
Mines closed

or converting to Copper or Cobalt
Shinkolowbe Mine has rich vein of UO2
Supplied U.S. ore for our first generation of nuclear weapons

Слайд 10 Uranium Dioxide (UO2)
1 ton of ore

Uranium  Dioxide (UO2)1 ton of ore contains 0.3 - 0.6%

contains 0.3 - 0.6% uranium
Shinkolowbe Mine has rich

vein of UO2
U.S. source of ore for the first generation of nuclear weapons
Mine closed due to low price of ore


D.R.C. Uranium Mines



Shinkolobwe

Musonoi

Swambo




High-grade Uranium Ore


Kasompi


Kamoto



Low-grade Uranium Ore


Kalongwe

Luiswishi


Uranium Oxide (U3O8) – Yellow Cake
Milling process takes place close to the mine
Yellow cake contains 60% – 85% uranium
U3O8 milling was done at Kolwezi and Likasi

Current Threat – Nuclear Material


Слайд 11 Current Threat – Nuclear Materials Trafficking



Current Threat – Nuclear Materials Trafficking

Слайд 12 Current Intelligence
A CIA electronic surveillance in the Gecamines

Current IntelligenceA CIA electronic surveillance in the Gecamines building (the D.R.C.

building (the D.R.C. state mining company) in Lubumbashi captured

the following:
Le gâteau a été payé. Préparer le chargement. Le colbalt va dans trois semaines.
Translation:
The cake has been paid for. Prepare the shipment. The colbalt goes in three weeks.
DTG: 171740ZApr03

Слайд 13 Current Intelligence
The CIA in Zanzibar, Tanzania tracking elements

Current IntelligenceThe CIA in Zanzibar, Tanzania tracking elements of Al Qaeda

of Al Qaeda have intercepted communications indicating a “priority

shipment” is imminent
The intercept defined the shipment as:
“…key to the Jihad”
“…will cripple the eagle”
“…send the team in two weeks”

The call was traced to Zanzibar City
DTG: 171830ZApr03




Слайд 14 Summary of the NSC Situation Brief
Cumulative CIA evidence

Summary of the NSC Situation BriefCumulative CIA evidence suggests Al Qaeda

suggests Al Qaeda is working directly with Gecamines and

the D.R.C. government to acquire yellow-cake from the Katanga mine region
The shipment will depart the mine region in three weeks
Exact location of the yellow-cake is unknown
How the yellow-cake will be shipped is tentative
Possibly buried in a shipment of Cobalt already scheduled for export
The destination of the yellow-cake is unknown
An Al Qaeda cell in Zanzibar is involved

Слайд 15 Summary of the NSC Situation Brief (2)
CIA proposes

Summary of the NSC Situation Brief (2)CIA proposes a black operation

a black operation to:
Find the yellow-cake prior to shipment
Track

the shipment to its final destination
Identify and maintain surveillance on the members of the Al Qaeda network and the D.R.C. government linked with the smuggling operation
At the designated time, pick-up the Al Qaeda operatives and responsible D.R.C. government officials, and
Seize the yellow-cake
CIA proposes SOCOM lead operation with CIA operatives providing additional in-country support

Слайд 16 Summary of the NSC Situation Brief (3)
The President

Summary of the NSC Situation Brief (3)The President agreed with the

agreed with the CIA proposal and made the following

decisions:
The operation will be covert
Diplomatic coordination will be made only with the host nation(s) needed to help position and provide support to our assets on the ground
Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda were the only African nations that publicly endorsed the U.S. war against Iraq and may be willing to support a black operation
Tanzania and Kenya should be considered as allies as they have stymied other yellow-cake shipments, and are struggling with Muslim extremists in their countries
Zambia, pinched between Angola and Zimbabwe who have lent military forces to defend D.R.C., can not be seen by their neighbors as openly working against D.R.C.

Слайд 17 Summary of the NSC Situation Brief (4)
The President’s

Summary of the NSC Situation Brief (4)The President’s decisions continued:SOCOM will

decisions continued:
SOCOM will assume operational command of all forces

used for this operation…“Operation Cakewalk”
CENTCOM, EUCOM, USCINCPAC, USSTRATCOM, and USTRANSCOM will be supporting commands
In addition, the President has directed simultaneous contingency planning for an assault on the Kinshasa Nuclear Research reactor
The objective is to determine the operational feasibility and identify the resources required to seize and transport the HEU fuel rods out of D.R.C. where the fissionable material can be controlled
The planning effort is named “Operation Hot Rod” and maybe executed in conjunction with seizing Al Qaeda and D.R.C. operatives under Operation Cakewalk

Слайд 18 National Objectives
The President’s stated the following national objectives

National ObjectivesThe President’s stated the following national objectives for Operation Cakewalk:Ensure

for Operation Cakewalk:
Ensure nation states and terror organizations located

in Central and East Africa are unable to threaten the U.S. or our allies with weapons of mass destruction
Stop the on-going, illicit trafficking of nuclear materials materials within D.R.C.
Improve the safety of the U.S., our allies, and the world by securing the fissionable materials in D.R.C.
Improve the stability of Central and East African nations by removing terrorist organizations and subversive government agents bent on obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction

Слайд 19 CINC Objectives
Find, track, and stop D.R.C. shipment(s) of

CINC ObjectivesFind, track, and stop D.R.C. shipment(s) of nuclear materials (yellow-cake

nuclear materials (yellow-cake )
Identify the terrorist and nation state

network illicitly trafficking nuclear materials from D.R.C.
Capture or otherwise neutralize this trafficking network
Includes D.R.C. Government officials involved in supplying and providing cover for the trafficking of nuclear material
Includes middle men and members of terrorists organizations that support the trafficking of nuclear materials and the development of WMD
Place U.S. forces in a position that leads D.R.C. to peacefully turn over the fissionable fuel rods from the Kinshasa reactor or have them removed by force

Слайд 20 Operation Cakewalk – IPB
Define the Environment
Terrain, weather, infrastructure,

Operation Cakewalk – IPBDefine the EnvironmentTerrain, weather, infrastructure, demographicsHistory, political relationships,

demographics
History, political relationships, economics
Evaluate Tactics, Techniques, & Procedures (TTP)
Gecamines

mining and product delivery practices
Kinshasa Nuclear Research Reactor operations
Al Qaeda cell operating techniques
Assess Environment Impacts on TTP
Anticipated Opposition COAs

Слайд 21 Southern Africa – Terrain & Weather

Likely operating area

Southern Africa – Terrain & WeatherLikely operating area to track shipment

to track shipment


Слайд 22 Southern Africa - Vegetation

Southern Africa - Vegetation

Слайд 23 Central Africa – Colonization/Languages

Central Africa – Colonization/Languages

Слайд 24 Southern Africa – Population Density

Southern Africa – Population Density

Слайд 25 Religions of Central Africa
Sudan’s border with C.A.R., D.C.R.,

Religions of Central AfricaSudan’s border with C.A.R., D.C.R., and Uganda represents

and Uganda represents a sharp divide between the density

of Muslim and Christian people

Слайд 26 Religions of Central Africa
Sudan’s border with C.A.R., D.C.R.,

Religions of Central AfricaSudan’s border with C.A.R., D.C.R., and Uganda represents

and Uganda represents a sharp divide between the density

of Muslim and Christian people

Tanzania is divided into religious sectors with traditional African religions dominating the west, Christians in the center, and Muslims along the coast
D.R.C.’s eastern border with Tanzania, and to a lesser extent with, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, represents a significant divide between the density of Christians and traditional African religions


Слайд 27 Southern Africa – Infrastructure

Southern Africa – Infrastructure

Слайд 28 D.R.C.
Tanzania
Zambia
Congo
Burundi
Rwanda
Angola
C.A.R.
Sudan
Central Africa – Regional Conflict
Bangui
Kenya
Uganda

D.R.C.TanzaniaZambiaCongoBurundiRwandaAngolaC.A.R.SudanCentral Africa – Regional ConflictBanguiKenyaUganda

Слайд 29 D.R.C.
Tanzania
Zambia
Congo
Burundi
Rwanda
Angola


Sudan vs SPLA
Sudan
C.A.R.
Kenya
Uganda
Central Africa – Regional Conflict

D.R.C.TanzaniaZambiaCongoBurundiRwandaAngolaSudan vs SPLA SudanC.A.R.KenyaUgandaCentral Africa – Regional Conflict

Слайд 30 D.R.C.
Tanzania
Zambia
Burundi
Rwanda
Angola


Sudan vs SPLA

C.A.R. vs Rebel Military
C.A.R.

Bangui
Sudan
Congo
Kenya
Uganda
Central

D.R.C.TanzaniaZambiaBurundiRwandaAngolaSudan vs SPLA C.A.R. vs Rebel Military C.A.R.BanguiSudanCongoKenyaUgandaCentral Africa – Regional Conflict

Africa – Regional Conflict


Слайд 31 D.R.C.
Tanzania
Zambia
Congo
Burundi
Rwanda
Angola


Sudan vs SPLA
Sudan

C.A.R. vs Rebel Military
C.A.R.

Congo

D.R.C.TanzaniaZambiaCongoBurundiRwandaAngolaSudan vs SPLA SudanC.A.R. vs Rebel Military C.A.R.Congo vs Ninja RebelsBanguiD.R.C.–

vs Ninja Rebels

Bangui

D.R.C.– Safe Haven
Kenya
Uganda
Central Africa – Regional Conflict


Слайд 32 Tanzania
Zambia
Burundi
Rwanda
Angola
C.A.R.
D.R.C.
Bangui
Congo
Kenya
Uganda
Central Africa – Regional Conflict
Sudan

TanzaniaZambiaBurundiRwandaAngolaC.A.R.D.R.C.BanguiCongoKenyaUgandaCentral Africa – Regional ConflictSudan

Слайд 33 DRC vs MLC CRD






Tanzania
Zambia
Burundi
Rwanda
Angola
C.A.R.
D.R.C.
Bangui
Congo


Kenya
Uganda
Central

DRC vs  MLC  CRDTanzaniaZambiaBurundiRwandaAngolaC.A.R.D.R.C.BanguiCongoKenyaUgandaCentral Africa – Regional ConflictSudan

Africa – Regional Conflict
Sudan


Слайд 34 DRC vs MLC CRD






Tanzania
Zambia
Burundi
Rwanda
Angola
C.A.R.
D.R.C.
Bangui
Congo


Kenya
Uganda
Central

DRC vs  MLC  CRDTanzaniaZambiaBurundiRwandaAngolaC.A.R.D.R.C.BanguiCongoKenyaUgandaCentral Africa – Regional ConflictSudan

Africa – Regional Conflict
Sudan


Слайд 35 Central Africa – Economic Status

Continuous conflict has made

Central Africa – Economic StatusContinuous conflict has made Central Africa one

Central Africa one of the poorest regions of the

world
D.R.C. is poorest of the poor:
D.R.C. has the largest disparity in the distribution of its wealth
Only $600.00 per capita income/year – 77% of population below poverty line
$31.1B in annual Gross Domestic Product
D.R.C. has the highest national debt - $12.4B

Слайд 36 Opposition TTP
To be supplied
DRC Mining practices
Kinshasa reactor operations
Al

Opposition TTPTo be suppliedDRC Mining practicesKinshasa reactor operationsAl Qaeda cell practices

Qaeda cell practices


Слайд 37 Shipment COA Analysis
Shipment Options
Rail COA
Road COA
Rail/Road COA
Air COA

Shipment COA AnalysisShipment OptionsRail COARoad COARail/Road COAAir COA

Слайд 38 Opposition COA Analysis – Rail
@ - Not operational

Opposition COA Analysis – Rail@	-	Not operational

Слайд 39
Kolwesi To:
@ - Not operational

Border
X-ings
Dist (Km)/
# Days
Lobito 1450/@ 1
Opposition COA

Kolwesi To:@	-	Not operationalBorder X-ingsDist (Km)/ # DaysLobito	1450/@	1Opposition COA Analysis – Rail

Analysis – Rail


Слайд 40
Kolwesi To:
* - Requires transload from 1.000m gauge track

Kolwesi To: *	-	Requires transload from 1.000m gauge track to 1.067m gauge

to 1.067m gauge track
@ - Not operational

Border
X-ings
Dist (Km)/
# Days
Lobito 1450/@ 1
Dar

es 2125/4 2
Salaam

Opposition COA Analysis – Rail


Слайд 41
Kolwesi To:
Border
X-ings
Dist (Km)/
# Days
Lobito 1450/@ 1
Dar es 2125/4 2
Salaam
Mombasa 2315/6* 3

Opposition

Kolwesi To:Border X-ingsDist (Km)/ # DaysLobito	1450/@	1Dar es 	2125/4	2SalaamMombasa	2315/6*	3Opposition COA Analysis – Rail

COA Analysis – Rail


Слайд 42
Kolwesi To:
Beira 2459/5 3
@ - Not operational
* - Requires transload to 1.067 gauge track

Border

Kolwesi To:Beira	2459/5	3@	-	Not operational*	-	Requires transload to 1.067 gauge trackBorder X-ingsDist (Km)/ #

X-ings
Dist (Km)/
# Days
Lobito 1450/@ 1
Dar es 2125/4 2
Salaam
Mombasa 2315/6* 3
Opposition COA Analysis –

Rail

Слайд 43
Transportation Options: Rail
Kolwesi To:
Durban 2936/6 4
@ - Not operational
* - Requires transload to 1.067

Transportation Options: RailKolwesi To:Durban	2936/6	4@	-	Not operational*	-	Requires transload to 1.067 gauge trackBeira	2459/5	3Border X-ingsDist (Km)/ # DaysLobito	1450/@	1Dar es 	2125/4	2SalaamMombasa	2315/6*	3

gauge track

Beira 2459/5 3
Border
X-ings
Dist (Km)/
# Days
Lobito 1450/@ 1
Dar es 2125/4 2
Salaam
Mombasa 2315/6* 3


Слайд 44 Transportation Options: Rail
@ - Not operational
* - Requires transload to 1.067 gauge

Transportation Options: Rail@	-	Not operational*	-	Requires transload to 1.067 gauge trackKolwesi To:Durban	2936/6	4Cape Town	3611/7	4Beira	2459/5	3Border

track

Kolwesi To:
Durban 2936/6 4
Cape Town 3611/7 4
Beira 2459/5 3
Border
X-ings
Dist (Km)/
# Days
Lobito 1450/@ 1
Dar es 2125/4 2
Salaam
Mombasa 2315/6* 3


Слайд 45 Most Likely Railroad COA
A
D.R.C.
Zambia
D.R.C.

Tunduma
Kolwesi
Likasi












Lubumbashi
Chingola
Mpika
Kasama
Njombe

Most Likely Railroad COAAD.R.C.ZambiaD.R.C.TundumaKolwesiLikasiLubumbashiChingolaMpikaKasamaNjombe

Слайд 46 Shipment COA Analysis – Road
To be supplied

Shipment COA Analysis – RoadTo be supplied

Слайд 47 Shipment COA Analysis – Air
To be supplied

Shipment COA Analysis – AirTo be supplied

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