Слайд 3
Current Threat
The D.R.C. is a lawless land unable
to capitalize on its huge store of valuable natural
resources
Years of conflict have left the D.R.C. in economic turmoil and incapable of assembling the resources necessary to control its borders or the multiple factions inside the country
Слайд 4
Current Threat
Strapped for the cash needed to deal
with their enemies, D.R.C. has shown a willingness to
deal with rouge nations & terrorist organizations
D.R.C. has been the object of terror states and organizations to obtain nuclear materials for “dirty bombs” and fissionable material to generate WMD
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Vulnerability of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Слайд 7
D.R.C. Link with the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Слайд 8
Current Threat – Fissionable Material
Built in 1959 via
President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” program
Refurbished in 1972 and
uses HEU fuel rods
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Current Threat – Nuclear Material
Uranium
Dioxide (UO2)
1 ton of ore contains 0.6% uranium
Mines closed
or converting to Copper or Cobalt
Shinkolowbe Mine has rich vein of UO2
Supplied U.S. ore for our first generation of nuclear weapons
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Uranium Dioxide (UO2)
1 ton of ore
contains 0.3 - 0.6% uranium
Shinkolowbe Mine has rich
vein of UO2
U.S. source of ore for the first generation of nuclear weapons
Mine closed due to low price of ore
D.R.C. Uranium Mines
Shinkolobwe
Musonoi
Swambo
High-grade Uranium Ore
Kasompi
Kamoto
Low-grade Uranium Ore
Kalongwe
Luiswishi
Uranium Oxide (U3O8) – Yellow Cake
Milling process takes place close to the mine
Yellow cake contains 60% – 85% uranium
U3O8 milling was done at Kolwezi and Likasi
Current Threat – Nuclear Material
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Current Threat – Nuclear Materials Trafficking
Слайд 12
Current Intelligence
A CIA electronic surveillance in the Gecamines
building (the D.R.C. state mining company) in Lubumbashi captured
the following:
Le gâteau a été payé. Préparer le chargement. Le colbalt va dans trois semaines.
Translation:
The cake has been paid for. Prepare the shipment. The colbalt goes in three weeks.
DTG: 171740ZApr03
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Current Intelligence
The CIA in Zanzibar, Tanzania tracking elements
of Al Qaeda have intercepted communications indicating a “priority
shipment” is imminent
The intercept defined the shipment as:
“…key to the Jihad”
“…will cripple the eagle”
“…send the team in two weeks”
The call was traced to Zanzibar City
DTG: 171830ZApr03
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Summary of the NSC Situation Brief
Cumulative CIA evidence
suggests Al Qaeda is working directly with Gecamines and
the D.R.C. government to acquire yellow-cake from the Katanga mine region
The shipment will depart the mine region in three weeks
Exact location of the yellow-cake is unknown
How the yellow-cake will be shipped is tentative
Possibly buried in a shipment of Cobalt already scheduled for export
The destination of the yellow-cake is unknown
An Al Qaeda cell in Zanzibar is involved
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Summary of the NSC Situation Brief (2)
CIA proposes
a black operation to:
Find the yellow-cake prior to shipment
Track
the shipment to its final destination
Identify and maintain surveillance on the members of the Al Qaeda network and the D.R.C. government linked with the smuggling operation
At the designated time, pick-up the Al Qaeda operatives and responsible D.R.C. government officials, and
Seize the yellow-cake
CIA proposes SOCOM lead operation with CIA operatives providing additional in-country support
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Summary of the NSC Situation Brief (3)
The President
agreed with the CIA proposal and made the following
decisions:
The operation will be covert
Diplomatic coordination will be made only with the host nation(s) needed to help position and provide support to our assets on the ground
Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda were the only African nations that publicly endorsed the U.S. war against Iraq and may be willing to support a black operation
Tanzania and Kenya should be considered as allies as they have stymied other yellow-cake shipments, and are struggling with Muslim extremists in their countries
Zambia, pinched between Angola and Zimbabwe who have lent military forces to defend D.R.C., can not be seen by their neighbors as openly working against D.R.C.
Слайд 17
Summary of the NSC Situation Brief (4)
The President’s
decisions continued:
SOCOM will assume operational command of all forces
used for this operation…“Operation Cakewalk”
CENTCOM, EUCOM, USCINCPAC, USSTRATCOM, and USTRANSCOM will be supporting commands
In addition, the President has directed simultaneous contingency planning for an assault on the Kinshasa Nuclear Research reactor
The objective is to determine the operational feasibility and identify the resources required to seize and transport the HEU fuel rods out of D.R.C. where the fissionable material can be controlled
The planning effort is named “Operation Hot Rod” and maybe executed in conjunction with seizing Al Qaeda and D.R.C. operatives under Operation Cakewalk
Слайд 18
National Objectives
The President’s stated the following national objectives
for Operation Cakewalk:
Ensure nation states and terror organizations located
in Central and East Africa are unable to threaten the U.S. or our allies with weapons of mass destruction
Stop the on-going, illicit trafficking of nuclear materials materials within D.R.C.
Improve the safety of the U.S., our allies, and the world by securing the fissionable materials in D.R.C.
Improve the stability of Central and East African nations by removing terrorist organizations and subversive government agents bent on obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction
Слайд 19
CINC Objectives
Find, track, and stop D.R.C. shipment(s) of
nuclear materials (yellow-cake )
Identify the terrorist and nation state
network illicitly trafficking nuclear materials from D.R.C.
Capture or otherwise neutralize this trafficking network
Includes D.R.C. Government officials involved in supplying and providing cover for the trafficking of nuclear material
Includes middle men and members of terrorists organizations that support the trafficking of nuclear materials and the development of WMD
Place U.S. forces in a position that leads D.R.C. to peacefully turn over the fissionable fuel rods from the Kinshasa reactor or have them removed by force
Слайд 20
Operation Cakewalk – IPB
Define the Environment
Terrain, weather, infrastructure,
demographics
History, political relationships, economics
Evaluate Tactics, Techniques, & Procedures (TTP)
Gecamines
mining and product delivery practices
Kinshasa Nuclear Research Reactor operations
Al Qaeda cell operating techniques
Assess Environment Impacts on TTP
Anticipated Opposition COAs
Слайд 21
Southern Africa – Terrain & Weather
Likely operating area
to track shipment
Слайд 23
Central Africa – Colonization/Languages
Слайд 24
Southern Africa – Population Density
Слайд 25
Religions of Central Africa
Sudan’s border with C.A.R., D.C.R.,
and Uganda represents a sharp divide between the density
of Muslim and Christian people
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Religions of Central Africa
Sudan’s border with C.A.R., D.C.R.,
and Uganda represents a sharp divide between the density
of Muslim and Christian people
Tanzania is divided into religious sectors with traditional African religions dominating the west, Christians in the center, and Muslims along the coast
D.R.C.’s eastern border with Tanzania, and to a lesser extent with, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, represents a significant divide between the density of Christians and traditional African religions
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Southern Africa – Infrastructure
Слайд 28
D.R.C.
Tanzania
Zambia
Congo
Burundi
Rwanda
Angola
C.A.R.
Sudan
Central Africa – Regional Conflict
Bangui
Kenya
Uganda
Слайд 29
D.R.C.
Tanzania
Zambia
Congo
Burundi
Rwanda
Angola
Sudan vs SPLA
Sudan
C.A.R.
Kenya
Uganda
Central Africa – Regional Conflict
Слайд 30
D.R.C.
Tanzania
Zambia
Burundi
Rwanda
Angola
Sudan vs SPLA
C.A.R. vs Rebel Military
C.A.R.
Bangui
Sudan
Congo
Kenya
Uganda
Central
Africa – Regional Conflict
Слайд 31
D.R.C.
Tanzania
Zambia
Congo
Burundi
Rwanda
Angola
Sudan vs SPLA
Sudan
C.A.R. vs Rebel Military
C.A.R.
Congo
vs Ninja Rebels
Bangui
D.R.C.– Safe Haven
Kenya
Uganda
Central Africa – Regional Conflict
Слайд 32
Tanzania
Zambia
Burundi
Rwanda
Angola
C.A.R.
D.R.C.
Bangui
Congo
Kenya
Uganda
Central Africa – Regional Conflict
Sudan
Слайд 33
DRC vs MLC CRD
Tanzania
Zambia
Burundi
Rwanda
Angola
C.A.R.
D.R.C.
Bangui
Congo
Kenya
Uganda
Central
Africa – Regional Conflict
Sudan
Слайд 34
DRC vs MLC CRD
Tanzania
Zambia
Burundi
Rwanda
Angola
C.A.R.
D.R.C.
Bangui
Congo
Kenya
Uganda
Central
Africa – Regional Conflict
Sudan
Слайд 35
Central Africa – Economic Status
Continuous conflict has made
Central Africa one of the poorest regions of the
world
D.R.C. is poorest of the poor:
D.R.C. has the largest disparity in the distribution of its wealth
Only $600.00 per capita income/year – 77% of population below poverty line
$31.1B in annual Gross Domestic Product
D.R.C. has the highest national debt - $12.4B
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Opposition TTP
To be supplied
DRC Mining practices
Kinshasa reactor operations
Al
Qaeda cell practices
Слайд 37
Shipment COA Analysis
Shipment Options
Rail COA
Road COA
Rail/Road COA
Air COA
Слайд 38
Opposition COA Analysis – Rail
@ - Not operational
Слайд 39
Kolwesi To:
@ - Not operational
Border
X-ings
Dist (Km)/
# Days
Lobito 1450/@ 1
Opposition COA
Analysis – Rail
Слайд 40
Kolwesi To:
* - Requires transload from 1.000m gauge track
to 1.067m gauge track
@ - Not operational
Border
X-ings
Dist (Km)/
# Days
Lobito 1450/@ 1
Dar
es 2125/4 2
Salaam
Opposition COA Analysis – Rail
Слайд 41
Kolwesi To:
Border
X-ings
Dist (Km)/
# Days
Lobito 1450/@ 1
Dar es 2125/4 2
Salaam
Mombasa 2315/6* 3
Opposition
COA Analysis – Rail
Слайд 42
Kolwesi To:
Beira 2459/5 3
@ - Not operational
* - Requires transload to 1.067 gauge track
Border
X-ings
Dist (Km)/
# Days
Lobito 1450/@ 1
Dar es 2125/4 2
Salaam
Mombasa 2315/6* 3
Opposition COA Analysis –
Rail
Слайд 43
Transportation Options: Rail
Kolwesi To:
Durban 2936/6 4
@ - Not operational
* - Requires transload to 1.067
gauge track
Beira 2459/5 3
Border
X-ings
Dist (Km)/
# Days
Lobito 1450/@ 1
Dar es 2125/4 2
Salaam
Mombasa 2315/6* 3
Слайд 44
Transportation Options: Rail
@ - Not operational
* - Requires transload to 1.067 gauge
track
Kolwesi To:
Durban 2936/6 4
Cape Town 3611/7 4
Beira 2459/5 3
Border
X-ings
Dist (Km)/
# Days
Lobito 1450/@ 1
Dar es 2125/4 2
Salaam
Mombasa 2315/6* 3
Слайд 45
Most Likely Railroad COA
A
D.R.C.
Zambia
D.R.C.
Tunduma
Kolwesi
Likasi
Lubumbashi
Chingola
Mpika
Kasama
Njombe
Слайд 46
Shipment COA Analysis – Road
To be supplied
Слайд 47
Shipment COA Analysis – Air
To be supplied