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Credit risk transfer instruments
Loan Sales
Securitization
Credit Derivatives
Traditional
Distress debt
Sovereign debt
Pass – through securities (CLN)
Collateralized Debt Obligations
Mortgage
– Backed Securities
Synthetic structured products
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AGENDA:
SECURITIZATION
The Pass -Through Security (PTS)
Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMO)
Mortgage-Backed
Bonds (MBBs)
CREDIT CRISIS 2007
What happened
Key mistakes
Key lessons
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I. SECURITIZATION
Securitization is a process of packaging and
selling of loans and other assets backed by securities.
Forms
of asset securitization:
Pass-through securities (PTS);
Collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO)
Mortgages-backed securities (MBS);
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The Pass-Through Security
Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA)
Sponsors MBS
programs and acts as a guarantor.
Timing insurance.
FNMA actually creates
MBSs by purchasing packages of mortgage loans.
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
Similar function to FNMA except major role has involved savings banks.
Stockholder owned with line of credit from the Treasury.
Sponsors conventional loan pools as well as FHA/VA mortgage pools.
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Major Benefits of Securitisation:
lower cost of funding due
to the enhanced rating stemming from mixed of senior
and junior securities issued.
capital saving from the sale of assets – decreases the minimum earnings required to ensure an adequate return to shareholders
important source of fee income
Investors enjoy the higher return from the mortgage market
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Incentives and Mechanics of
Pass-Through Security Creation
Example: Assume
that Bank has 1000 new residential mortgages with the
average size of each = $100 000, maturity 30 years, mortgage coupon 12% p/a
The total size of new mortgage pool is $100mill=1000*100 000
Capital adequacy requirements (risk weight is 35%) =100*0.08*0.35=$2.8mill
Minimum reserve requirements 10 % of deposits:
Assets Liabilities
Cash = 0.1 * D Deposits (D) = x
Mortgages = 100 Equity = 2.8
0.1D+100 = 2.8+D
Therefore, D=108 mill.
Asset Liabilities
Cash = 10.8 Deposits = 108
Mortgages = 100 Capital = 2.8
Total = 110.8 Total = 110.8
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Mechanics of
Pass-Through Security Creation
Bank pays annual insurance
premium to the FDIC. Assume the deposit insurance premium
of 27 bps.
Premium = $108 x 0.0027 = $0.2916
It is treated as non interest expense and recorded in the Income statement.
3 levels of regulatory taxes:
Capital requirements;
Reserve requirements;
Deposit insurance premium.
Additional exposures:
Gap exposure or Da > kDl .
Liquidity exposure.
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GNMA Pass-Through process:
Creation of the Asset backed security
(ABS)
Mortgage credit
insurance
Bank
Mortgages
2. SPV
Mortgages are
placed on balance
sheet
3.
GNMA
Bond created
4. Outside
investors
GNMA timing
insurance of cash
flow to
bondholders
5. Sale proceeds
For GNMA bonds
Fee 6bp
Fee 44bp
Coupon 12%
Coupon 11.5%
Household
12%
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Calculation of a constant monthly payment of borrowers:
Size of the pool: PV = $100 000 000
(1000 x $100 000)
Maturity: n =30 years
Number of monthly payments per year: m =12
Annual mortgage coupon rate: r = 12%
PMT = constant monthly payment to pay off the mortgages over its life
PMT = $100 mill / {1 - 1/(1+r/m) mn}
r/m
PMT = $100 mill / {1 - 1/(1+0.12/12) 360} = $1,028,613
0.12/12
$1,028.61 per mortgage for 1000 mortgages
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Payment schedule
Fully amortized mortgages:
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GNMA Pass-Through process
The bank aggregates the payments for
mortgages and passes funds through to GNMA the bond
investors via trustee net servicing fee and insurance fee deductions.
As a result the coupon rate on bonds will be set at approximately 0.5% below the coupon rate on the underlying mortgages.
Mortgage coupon rate = 12%
Servicing fee = - 0.44%
Government insurance fee = - 0.06%
Pass through bonds = 11.5%
Therefore, if a life insurance company bought 25% of GNMA bond issue it would get 25% share of the 360 promised monthly payments from the mortgage pool.
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Further Incentives
The attractiveness of these bonds to investors.
In particular, investors in these bonds are protected against
2 levels of default risk:
1. Default risk of the borrowers.
If the prices on houses fall rapidly, a homeowner can leave the low-valued mortgage. This might expose the mortgage bondholders to loses unless there are external guarantors.
2. Default risk of Bank/ SPV
Even if the bank or trustee bankrupt, GNMA would bear the costs of making the promised payments in full and on time to GNMA bondholders (due to GNMA insurance).
Assumed LGD = 25%
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Effects of prepayments
Prepayment risk is the risk that
the loan will be paid off before the contracted
maturity.
Sources of risk:
Mortgage refinancing due to decrease in interest rates
Housing Turnover
Good news effects
Lower market yields increase present value of cash flows.
Principal received sooner.
Bad news effects
Fewer interest payments in total.
Reinvestment at lower rates.
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Asset Backed Security (continued)
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The Waterfall
Equity Tranche
1st loss
2nd loss, if 1st loss
is more than 5%
3d loss, if 2nd loss is
more than 20%
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Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (ABS CMO) were created to
manage
the prepayment risk
Assets
Senior Tranche (80%)
AAA
Mezzanine Tranche (15%)
BBB
Equity Tranche
(5%)
Not Rated
Senior Tranche (65%)
AAA
Mezzanine Tranche (25%) BBB
Equity Tranche (10%)
The mezzanine tranche is repackaged with other mezzanine tranches
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Collateralized Mortgage
Obligation (CMO)
Prepayment effects differ across tranches
(classes)
R Class
Improves marketability of the bonds
Mezzanine
Tranche
A
B
C
Mezzanine
Tranche
B
C
$2.5 mill
P
= $1 500 000
C = $291 667
$1208333
C = $ 333 333
C= $375 000
P=500 000
C = $ 333 333
C = $375 000
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Mortgage-Backed
Bonds (MBBs)
Normally remain on the balance sheet.
No
direct link between the cash flows on the underlying
mortgages and the interest and principal payments on the MBB.
Issued to reduce the risk to the MBB bond holders:
Segregation the group of mortgages on the balance sheet;
Pledging this group as collateral against the MBB issue.
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Mortgage-Backed
Bonds (MBBs)
EXAMPLE: Before securitization
Problems: Da >
Dl, high risk premium paid to uninsured depositors.
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Mortgage-Backed
Bonds (MBBs)
Weaknesses:
Tied up mortgages on the balance
sheet for a long time;
Increases the illiquidity of the
asset portfolio;
Over-collateralization;
Liability for capital adequacy and reserve requirement taxes.
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Securitization of other assets
CARDs
Various receivables, loans, junk bonds,
ARMs.
Can all assets be securitized?
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U.S. Real Estate Prices, 1987 to 2009: S&P/Case-Shiller
Composite-10 Index
Credit Crisis 2007
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What happened…
Relaxation of Mortgage standards
Starting in 2000, mortgage
originators in the US relaxed their lending standards and
created large numbers of subprime first mortgages.
Very low interest rates,
Increased demand for real estate ? boost in mortgage prices ? real estate speculation
Further relaxation of lending standards
Mortgage lenders and brokers wanted to keep their profit and knew that loans would be sold.
Features of the market: teaser rates, NINJAs, liar loans
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What happened...
Mortgages were packaged in financial products and
sold to investors:
The most important thing for the lenders
was whether the mortgage could be sold to others.
Banks found it profitable to invest in the AAA rated tranches
Their promised return was significantly higher than the cost of funds and capital requirements were low
In 2007 the bubble burst.
Some borrowers could not afford their payments when the teaser rates ended.
U.S. real estate prices fell and products, created from the mortgages, that were previously thought to be safe began to be viewed as risky
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Key Mistakes Made By the Market
Ratings to tranches
was not assigned relative to the risk:
Rating agencies had
lack of experience in rating structured products and used relatively little historical data.
Mispricing of securitization tranches:
Assumption that a BBB tranche is like a BBB bond. In reality, BBB tranches were much more risky and incurred losses 100 % instead of assumed 25%.
Default correlation was not taken into account when assessing the credit risk:
Default correlation goes up in stressed market conditions.
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Key Mistakes Made By the Market
Regulators required to
retain only from 5% to 10% of tranche by
the originator when the credit risk is transferred
Crisis showed that it was not enough to control the risk appetite of originators.
Regulators and investors did not understand the overall risk of FIs:
Over-the-counter derivatives’ positions were hidden off the balance sheet
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Lessons learned:
Ensure transparency of complex products.
Creators of
the products should provide a way for potential purchasers
to assess the risks (e.g., by providing software)
Over-the-counter derivatives should be:
Daily marked to market;
Put on the balance sheet
FIs need to create models to assess the risks
Most financial institutions did not have models to value the tranches they traded. Without a valuation model risk management is virtually impossible
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Lessons learned:
More emphasis on stress testing
More emphasis on
stress testing and managerial judgement; less on the mechanistic
application of VaR models (particularly when times are good)
Senior management must be involved in the development of stress test scenarios
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Major Reasons of the Financial Crisis
in Kazakhstan
Financing
of the high credit growth through external borrowings;
Given up
liquidity for profitability;
Limited investment opportunities:
Risky investments
Low diversification across different sectors:
High concentration risk
Overvalued real estate prices in 2006-2007;
Fall in collateral value increases loans’ LGD
Slow reaction of AFN to changes and underestimation of major risks:
Regulatory oversight
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Why Financial Crisis in Kazakhstan was not so
severe as in developed countries?
Proportion of foreign banks was
relatively low.
63% of all market belonged to the 4 largest KZ banks
Amount of mortgages for securitization was still not high enough to practice active securitization.
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Real Estate Price Dynamic
in Kazakhstan
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Structural changes in Kazakhstani banking industry since 2008.
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Concentration ratios of top five Kazakhstani banks
Source:
www.afn.kz
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Market share of local bank vs market share
of banks with foreign ownership
Source: www.afn.kz
All data as
of January 1 of the given year.