Презентация на тему Mechanism design. (Lecture 9)

alter the outcome of the game.
They may announce the

intended action (cheap talk) in order to facilitate coordination.
In games with incomplete information, players may consider taking actions that signal their type (signaling), or find out the type of the other player (screening).
e.g. provide warranties to signal the quality of your products.
e.g. go to university to signal your skills.

in place by the less-informed player to create motives

for the more-informed player to take actions beneficial to the less-informed player.

willingness to pay is unknown to the seller.
Mechanism design:

price system that makes buyers with high willingness-to-pay buy higher quality products at a higher price.
Incentives for effort
Manager/employee.
Source of incomplete information: the manager cannot observe how hard employees work.
Mechanism design: align the incentives of employees to the incentives of the manager, and induce employees to exert high effort.

the agents (the informed players) do what we want

them to do.

Participation constraint
Make sure that the agents have sufficient payoff, otherwise they may go elsewhere.

for the same product.
Bob willing to pay $20; Bill

willing to pay $10.
Is it optimal to charge the same price ($10) to both consumers?
To maximize profit, the seller will try to sell the good for $20 to Bob; and for $10 to Bill.

Price discrimination

not feasible: sellers may not observe individual consumers’ willingness

to pay.

Then what? Seller may design a price system to implement some sort of price discrimination:
Price system that will separate buyers into different groups and allow the seller to increase profit.

first-class.
Two types of travellers: tourists (#70) and business

travellers (#30).
Business travellers are willing to pay a higher price than tourists.

first-class ticket: 300-150=150
Profit for economy ticket: 225-100=125
Selling to a

tourist
Profit for first-class ticket: 175-150=25
Profit for economy ticket: 140-100=40

Better sell first-class tickets to business travellers,
and economy tickets to tourists....

Problem: individual travellers’ type is unknown

airline initially does not have enough information on types

of customers, and cannot ask different prices to different travellers.
Demographics (age; gender etc.) may provide information on the type...but it may be illegal/unethical to use this information.
If the airline asks 300 for a first-class seat, business travellers will rather buy an economy class ticket.
If the economy ticket is at 140, business travellers would prefer pay 140 for an economy seat, rather than pay 300 for a first-class seat.
If the economy ticket is at 140, business travellers have consumer surplus of 225 -140 = 85 in economy class ticket.

travellers choose to buy first-class tickets, and tourists choose

to buy economy class tickets.
Suppose the airline charges X for economy, and Y for first-class.
X and Y should be such that tourists choose economy, and business travellers choose first-class.
Two constraints.
Constraint #1: Participation constraint
Charge maximum 140 for economy class, otherwise tourists drop off. (X<140)
Charge maximum 300 for first-class. (Y<300)

that business travellers prefer buying first-class tickets:






i.e. the first-class

ticket should not be more than $75 more expensive than the economy ticket

surplus of business travellers
if buy economy

surplus of business travellers
if buy first-class

that tourists prefer buying economy tickets:





i.e. the first-class ticket

should be between $35 and $75 more expensive than the economy ticket.

(140+75).
By pricing first-class seats at 215 and economy seats

at 140, the airline can separate the two types.
Note that business travellers have a surplus of 85=300-215
First-class seats are sold at rebate price (215 vs. 300).
Total profit: (140-100)70+(215-150)30=4,750

$208, price is $649
64GB model: cost of components is

$229, price is $749
128GB model: cost of components is $265, price is $849
($30-40 cost differential, but a $100 price differential)

etc. It has two methods of sale:
1. Full price

at its own stores and at selected retailers. Full price only, never any discount. Average age of shopper is 35; average expenditure is $1,100.
2. Discount outlet stores that sell last season’s products for less. Stores usually 100km away from nearest full-price retailer. Average age of shopper is 45; average expenditure is $770.

$259
6/10, $189

incomplete information: the manager cannot observe how hard employees

work, consequently employees may not work as hard as they are supposed to (moral hazard).





Mechanism design: align the incentives of the employee to the incentives of the manager.

MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM: unobservable actions distort
an agent’s incentives after the transaction is made

willing to eat poorly, smoke etc.
Home Insurance -- less

willing to install alarms and better locks
Car Insurance -- take more risks while driving
Work
Employees may not produce high effort, and still get paid.

supervise a project.






In case of success, the profit is

$1million. In case of failure it is $0.

High
effort

Low
effort

Pr(success)=1/2

Pr(success)=1/4

manager

his utility is given by:
u=√y, where y is income

(in million of $)

The disutility of effort is 0.1.

The outside option is $90k, yielding utility of √0.09=0.3

are simple:
Either work hard or be fired.
To induce

the manager to exert high effort, we must pay him at least $160k:
u= √0.16-0.1=0.3
If we pay less than $160k, he will resign and take the outside option
Simple contract: The employee is paid $160k in exchange for high effort.

output may be observed, but not his effort level.
How

to induce high effort?
Compensation contract must rely on something that can be directly observed and verified.
Project’s success or failure -- Related to effort.
Imperfect but relevant information.
Compensation rule:
Pay a basic wage (x) if the project fails
Pay more (y) if the project succeeds, such that y>x

effort to low effort





Solves to:
In order to induce high

effort, success has to be
sufficiently rewarded relative to failure.

Utility if high effort

Utility if low effort

to work for you:





Solves to:
In order to keep the

manager, the expected
compensation has to be large enough.

Utility if high effort

Utility if outside option

$40k
The manager is paid $40k if the project fails

and $360k if it succeeds.
The reward for success must be large enough to compensate for:
the cost of effort (0.1)
the risk of receiving no bonus in case the project fails (50%)

success is very large, and just enough to induce

the manager to exert high effort.

case of failure?
x=0
To ensure participation, y would have to

be very large:


The compensation for success would have to be $640k
Better provide a base salary of $40k.

store managers’ staffing and stocking decisions (effort is important).

Profits are easy to measure at store level.
CEOs:
compensation based on the stock price.
stock price is an imperfect measure of firm performance.

glass in the US.
1994: CEO Garen Staglin instituted a

new compensation scheme for glass installers.
A very competitive industry so costs and productivity really matters to get prices down and response time up.

did not vary with number of windows installed.
Installer’s job

is monitored and they are required to meet minimum quality standards.
Managers were worried that installers just did the minimum number of windows per week to keep their jobs.

maximum of:
Amount they would have made according to the

old hourly wage system
A fixed amount per job completed
Consequently, enterprising installers could do a lot better.
Possibility to sometimes double compensation compared to the old system.

week increased by 44%
Changed behaviour
Technicians didn’t drive as far

for a job
Checked they had parts at beginning of day
Maintained tools
Unit labour costs fell from $44.43 to $35.24 per window
Average compensation per worker rose but productivity rose even more