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Презентация на тему International management

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PLAN FOR THE DAYPart 1: How do (differences in) formal institutions pose non-trivial risks for international business?Part 2: How do firms use political relationships to (re)shape the rules under which they operate?Part 3: How can these
International Management PLAN FOR THE DAYPart 1: How do (differences in) formal institutions pose PART 1:HOW DO FORMAL INSTITUTIONS RELATE TO RISK? GOVERNMENTS MATTER South KoreaCanada ThailandSingaporeDenmarkJapanFranceIt is illegal to kill a sasquatch in... You must INSTITUTIONS CAN BE WEAK OR STRONG“Institutional weakness” means incentive structures are absent, INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS = UNCERTAINTY“All traffic laws in European countries aren't really followed.”“Shopping e.g. the protection of intellectual property rightsENFORCEMENT ISSUES Corruption and bribery‘Facilitating payments’ - not uncommonUS has laws against bribery abroad ON CORRUPTION Institutional barriers: host-country regulationsFDI requirementsRestrictions on marketingLimits on income repatriationEnvironmental regulation‘Anti-terrorism’ Embargoes and sanctions (e.g. Cuba, North Korea)Boycotts (e.g. Shell / Nigeria)Terrorism (e.g. OTHER UNPREDICTABLES… MARKET STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING RISK Negotiating risk has a price, and that PART 2:POLITICAL STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING RISK:THE BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT NEXUS Firms have two basic strategies to exert pressure on politicians: Voice and ‘Voice’ is big business. In the US in 2007, for instance:AMA spent ‘VOICE’ STRATEGIES Threat of relocation is real, but should not be overstated – governments HOW DO GOVERNMENTS RESPOND TO ‘VOICE’?With favorable rules! (=INSTITUTIONS)Exporting industries: subsidiesGetting the PART 3:HOW DO POLITICAL STRATEGIES AFFECT INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVE SUCCESS? WE CAN LOOK AT IT FROM THIS ANGLEWhy do some firms enjoy Business-government dynamics differ across countriesIn ‘Pluralist’/ ‘Associational’: countriesLarge number of interests exist IN THE BRAZIL/ CANADA CASE:Questions: What does it mean to “win” the PART 4:INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS – CULTURE DEALING WITH CULTURAL DIFFERENCES“You are a mid-level manager in a Dutch company CULTURE“The collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one Is there then no “right” or “best” way of doing things? So, PART 5:DIMENSIONS OF CULTURE AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES HOFSTEDE’S DIMENSIONSPower distance: weaker members’ acceptance of inequalityIndividualism: loose ties between individuals; MEASURING HOFSTEDE’S DIMENSIONSPower distance is higher when:PDI1: A good working relationship with Individualism is greater when:IDV1: sufficient time for your personal or family life Masculinity is greater when:MAS1: you think most people cannot be trustedMAS2: you MEASURING HOFSTEDE’S DIMENSIONSUncertainty avoidance is greater when:UAI1: you feel nervous or tense MEASURING HOFSTEDE’S DIMENSIONSLong-term orientation is greater when:LTO1: you attach more importance to PART 6:THE RELEVANCE OF CULTURE FOR BUSINESS CULTURE AS A BARRIER“Psychic”/ cultural distance: how different countries are in terms CULTURE’S RELEVANCE FOR MARKETINGCzinkota et al. (2005), p. 59 CULTURE’S RELEVANCE FOR MANAGEMENTHofstede, G. (1983) The cultural relativity of organizational practices QUESTIONS?
Слайды презентации

Слайд 2 PLAN FOR THE DAY
Part 1: How do (differences

PLAN FOR THE DAYPart 1: How do (differences in) formal institutions

in) formal institutions pose non-trivial risks for international business?
Part

2: How do firms use political relationships to (re)shape the rules under which they operate?
Part 3: How can these ‘non-market strategies’ create opportunities that affect international competitive success?
Part 4: Informal institutions: looking at culture
Part 5: Dimensions of culture and cultural distance
Part 6: The relevance of culture for business

Слайд 3 PART 1:

HOW DO FORMAL INSTITUTIONS RELATE TO RISK?

PART 1:HOW DO FORMAL INSTITUTIONS RELATE TO RISK?

Слайд 4 GOVERNMENTS MATTER

GOVERNMENTS MATTER

Слайд 5 South Korea
Canada
Thailand
Singapore
Denmark
Japan
France
It is illegal to kill a

South KoreaCanada ThailandSingaporeDenmarkJapanFranceIt is illegal to kill a sasquatch in... You

sasquatch in...
You must make sure there are no

children under your car before you start the engine in...
It is illegal to kiss in train stations in...
Traffic police are required to report all bribes that they receive from motorists in...
It is illegal to pee in an elevator in...
It is illegal to leave your house if you are not wearing underwear in...
The “age of consent” is as low as 13 in...

Try to match numbers with letters:

RISK = WHEN THE RULES ARE UNKNOWN


Слайд 6 INSTITUTIONS CAN BE WEAK OR STRONG
“Institutional weakness” means

INSTITUTIONS CAN BE WEAK OR STRONG“Institutional weakness” means incentive structures are

incentive structures are absent, arbitrary, or ambiguous
This translates into

unpredictability and thus risk: political risk, legal risk, financial risk
Depends in part on whether society is rule-based or relationship-based:
In rule-based settings, institutions are
more transparent and predictable
(to outsiders) than in relationship-based settings

Слайд 7 INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS = UNCERTAINTY
“All traffic laws in European

INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS = UNCERTAINTY“All traffic laws in European countries aren't really

countries aren't really followed.”
“Shopping in Seoul – Instead of

paying previously established prices, individuals often bargain.”

Слайд 8 e.g. the protection of intellectual property rights
ENFORCEMENT ISSUES

e.g. the protection of intellectual property rightsENFORCEMENT ISSUES

Слайд 9 Corruption and bribery

‘Facilitating payments’ - not uncommon
US has

Corruption and bribery‘Facilitating payments’ - not uncommonUS has laws against bribery

laws against bribery abroad (the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act)
But:

how to define bribery, especially where a technical, legal definition is lacking?

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES


Слайд 10 ON CORRUPTION

ON CORRUPTION

Слайд 11 Institutional barriers: host-country regulations
FDI requirements
Restrictions on marketing
Limits

Institutional barriers: host-country regulationsFDI requirementsRestrictions on marketingLimits on income repatriationEnvironmental

on income repatriation
Environmental regulation
‘Anti-terrorism’ laws
Competition policy
INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTH CAN =

RISK

Слайд 12 Embargoes and sanctions (e.g. Cuba, North Korea)
Boycotts (e.g.

Embargoes and sanctions (e.g. Cuba, North Korea)Boycotts (e.g. Shell / Nigeria)Terrorism

Shell / Nigeria)
Terrorism (e.g. Spain (ETA), India,
Pakistan, Iraq)
Hostage

taking (e.g. Colombia)
Expropriation (e.g. Colombia)

OTHER UNPREDICTABLES…


Слайд 13 OTHER UNPREDICTABLES…

OTHER UNPREDICTABLES…

Слайд 14 MARKET STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING RISK
 Negotiating risk has

MARKET STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING RISK Negotiating risk has a price, and

a price, and that price can be evidenced in

various hedging strategies:
Allying with local partners in foreign locations
Using extensive legal contracts and dispute settlement (conciliation, arbitration, litigation)
Keeping intellectual property close to home
Spreading operations across multiple locations
Continuous monitoring of the environment, including contingency planning (financial reserves)

Слайд 15 PART 2:
POLITICAL STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING RISK:
THE BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT NEXUS

PART 2:POLITICAL STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING RISK:THE BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT NEXUS

Слайд 16 Firms have two basic strategies to exert pressure

Firms have two basic strategies to exert pressure on politicians: Voice

on politicians: Voice and Exit
Voice typically means lobbying, but

can also be collective bargaining
Exit means relocating value-adding activities offshore (or at least the threat)
Business-government interaction can be thought of as institution building (establishing rules)

BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT DYNAMICS


Слайд 17 ‘Voice’ is big business. In the US in

‘Voice’ is big business. In the US in 2007, for instance:AMA

2007, for instance:
AMA spent $22.1 million
GE spent $23.6 million
US

CoC spent $52.8 million
Drug and Health Care product makers spent $227 million
 ... for a Grand Total of $2.79 billion, or $17 million for each day Congress was in session

‘VOICE’ STRATEGIES


Слайд 18 ‘VOICE’ STRATEGIES

‘VOICE’ STRATEGIES

Слайд 19 Threat of relocation is real, but should not

Threat of relocation is real, but should not be overstated –

be overstated – governments want their firms to stay
So

does the firm!
Consider the $ invested in ‘voice’ vs. ‘exit’ (given that only 10% of world GDP is foreign controlled)
Governments invest in public goods and policies designed to ‘help’ their own firms and benefit the economy – they don’t want this to drain away

‘EXIT’ VERSUS ‘VOICE’?


Слайд 20 HOW DO GOVERNMENTS RESPOND TO ‘VOICE’?

With favorable rules!

HOW DO GOVERNMENTS RESPOND TO ‘VOICE’?With favorable rules! (=INSTITUTIONS)Exporting industries: subsidiesGetting

(=INSTITUTIONS)
Exporting industries: subsidies
Getting the competitor to cede market share
Import-competing

industries: tariffs
Getting ‘infant industries’ competitive
Domestic non-tradable industries: FDI restrictions
Securing value added within borders

Слайд 21 PART 3:
HOW DO POLITICAL STRATEGIES AFFECT INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVE

PART 3:HOW DO POLITICAL STRATEGIES AFFECT INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVE SUCCESS?

SUCCESS?


Слайд 22 WE CAN LOOK AT IT FROM THIS ANGLE
Why

WE CAN LOOK AT IT FROM THIS ANGLEWhy do some firms

do some firms enjoy a political advantage over their

competitors in international trade disputes?

Слайд 23 Business-government dynamics differ across countries
In ‘Pluralist’/ ‘Associational’: countries
Large

Business-government dynamics differ across countriesIn ‘Pluralist’/ ‘Associational’: countriesLarge number of interests

number of interests exist with equal access to policymakers;

government relatively neutral
In ‘Corporatist’ countries:
Close ties between government and corporate elite aimed at long-term growth; greater government intervention

...BECAUSE OF BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT
RELATIONSHIPS

How does this relate to the ability to grant political favors?


Слайд 24 IN THE BRAZIL/ CANADA CASE:
Questions:
What does it

IN THE BRAZIL/ CANADA CASE:Questions: What does it mean to “win”

mean to “win” the subsidy game?
What evidence do you

see of “pluralism” in Canada, as opposed to Brazil?
How does this contrast affect Bombardier’s ability to win the subsidy game?
Knowing this, what option should Bombardier push for in this case?

Слайд 25 PART 4:

INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS – CULTURE

PART 4:INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS – CULTURE

Слайд 26 DEALING WITH CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
“You are a mid-level manager

DEALING WITH CULTURAL DIFFERENCES“You are a mid-level manager in a Dutch

in a Dutch company involved in business dealings with

a company in Panama. You spot something in the contract that you think needs to be changed. You contact your counterpart at the Panamanian company and explain your concerns.”

Should you expect a quick decision by the Panamanian company? Why or why not?

Слайд 27 CULTURE
“The collective programming of the mind which distinguishes

CULTURE“The collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of

the members of one group or category of people

from another” – Geert Hofstede
Connected to language, regions, religion, ethnicity… so many dimensions
Cultural misunderstandings are largely cognitive – a key part of the “liability of foreignness”
Organizational culture is strongly embedded in national culture

Слайд 28 Is there then no “right” or “best” way

Is there then no “right” or “best” way of doing things?

of doing things?
So, different measures of “performance” are

ok?
If culture and norms underlie laws, then different laws are ok too? Bribery is ok then?
Are there any “universal” values (“hypernorms”)?
What are the implications for the more “vague” activities, such as Corporate Social Responsibility and ethics

CULTURE


Слайд 29 PART 5:

DIMENSIONS OF CULTURE AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

PART 5:DIMENSIONS OF CULTURE AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

Слайд 30 HOFSTEDE’S DIMENSIONS
Power distance: weaker members’ acceptance of inequality
Individualism:

HOFSTEDE’S DIMENSIONSPower distance: weaker members’ acceptance of inequalityIndividualism: loose ties between

loose ties between individuals; each responsible for him/herself
Masculinity: the

degree to which men have different values than women
Uncertainty avoidance: a function of how comfortable group members feel with uncertainty
Long-term orientation: thrift and perseverance

Слайд 31 MEASURING HOFSTEDE’S DIMENSIONS
Power distance is higher when:
PDI1: A

MEASURING HOFSTEDE’S DIMENSIONSPower distance is higher when:PDI1: A good working relationship

good working relationship with your direct superior is more

important
PDI2: Being consulted by your direct superior in his/her decisions is less important
PDI3: subordinates are more afraid to express disagreement with their superiors
PDI4: you are ok with an organizational structure in which certain subordinates have two bosses

Слайд 32 Individualism is greater when:
IDV1: sufficient time for your

Individualism is greater when:IDV1: sufficient time for your personal or family

personal or family life is important
IDV2: good physical working

conditions (good ventilation and lighting, adequate work space, etc.) are not so important
IDV3: security of employment is not so important
IDV4: variety and adventure in the job is important

=> Behavior towards others depends on group membership in collectivist societies, but not in individualist societies

MEASURING HOFSTEDE’S DIMENSIONS


Слайд 33 Masculinity is greater when:
MAS1: you think most people

Masculinity is greater when:MAS1: you think most people cannot be trustedMAS2:

cannot be trusted
MAS2: you think that it is usually

their own fault when people have failed in life
MAS3: working with people who cooperate well with one another is not so important
MAS4: having an opportunity for advancement to higher level jobs is important

MEASURING HOFSTEDE’S DIMENSIONS


Слайд 34 MEASURING HOFSTEDE’S DIMENSIONS
Uncertainty avoidance is greater when:
UAI1: you

MEASURING HOFSTEDE’S DIMENSIONSUncertainty avoidance is greater when:UAI1: you feel nervous or

feel nervous or tense at work
UAI2: you think one

cannot be a good manager without having precise answers to most questions that subordinates may raise about their work
UAI3: you think competition between employees usually does more harm than good
UAI4: you think an organization's rules should not be broken, even when the employee thinks it is in the company's best interest

Слайд 35 MEASURING HOFSTEDE’S DIMENSIONS
Long-term orientation is greater when:
LTO1: you

MEASURING HOFSTEDE’S DIMENSIONSLong-term orientation is greater when:LTO1: you attach more importance

attach more importance to thrift/ being economical
LTO2: you attach

less importance to respect for tradition and ‘saving face’

Слайд 36 PART 6:

THE RELEVANCE OF CULTURE FOR BUSINESS

PART 6:THE RELEVANCE OF CULTURE FOR BUSINESS

Слайд 37 CULTURE AS A BARRIER
“Psychic”/ cultural distance: how different

CULTURE AS A BARRIER“Psychic”/ cultural distance: how different countries are in

countries are in terms of their culture
Comparing Hofstede’s

scores between 2 countries:
PDI1 minus PDI2
UAI1 minus UAI2 etc.

As we will see, IM research shows that cultural distance is important for MNE strategy and operations (e.g. for entry modes and organizational structures)


Слайд 38 CULTURE’S RELEVANCE FOR MARKETING
Czinkota et al. (2005), p.

CULTURE’S RELEVANCE FOR MARKETINGCzinkota et al. (2005), p. 59

Слайд 39 CULTURE’S RELEVANCE FOR MANAGEMENT
Hofstede, G. (1983) The cultural

CULTURE’S RELEVANCE FOR MANAGEMENTHofstede, G. (1983) The cultural relativity of organizational

relativity of organizational practices and theories. Journal of International

Business Studies, p. 82

Tools for dealing with organizational dilemmas?
French:
Germans:
Brits:
Indians:


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